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the movement to revive aesthetic theory in the contemporary world has 
produced a fascination with images that has been haunted by the ghost of 
Platonism. this is true despite the fact that there has been no single, more 
sustained, or emphatic intellectual enterprise among contemporary aesthetic 
theorists than to exorcise Plato’s philosophical presence. this should hardly 
come as a surprise. As with postmodern philosophy generally, contempo-
rary aesthetic theory is embedded in a culture dominated by images, and so 
would seem to require a reversal of Plato’s critique of image-making, includ-
ing the images that are prominent in art. in adopting this stance, contempo-
rary aesthetic theory follows closely in the footsteps of its great-grandfather, 
nietzsche, whose own project was conceived as a “reversal” of Platonism. A 
crucial remark is found in nietzsche’s notebooks of 1870–71: “My philoso-
phy reversed Platonism: the farther removed from true beings, all the purer, 
more beautiful, better it is.”1 indeed, one of nietzsche’s great hopes was to 
recover the value of the world of appearances that Plato and his philosophi-
cal heirs seemed to have disparaged. if, as outlined in Republic, iii and X, 
Plato is skeptical about images because they stand at several removes from 
the truth of the eternal forms, then it would seem to be the duty of aesthetic 
theory to overturn Platonism so as to re-capture whatever truth images may 
contain. But, as i hope to explain, the critique of Plato that underpins much 
contemporary aesthetic theory is based on a tradition that has misconstrued 
some of Plato’s fundamental ideas. it is contradictory in other ways as well. 
While one of its main concerns is to assert the validity of contemporary art, 
it is engaged in a project that is far broader than what may be associated with 
any narrowly-bounded aesthetic sphere. indeed, the goals of contemporary 
1 Friedrich nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studiensausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and 
Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), vii, p. 199. 
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aesthetics require a de-coupling of aesthetics from art. they involve coming 
to terms with the implications of nietzsche’s insistence that existence and 
the world could be justified only in aesthetic terms.2) in the view of one 
writer, Alexander nehamas, this implies the transformation of life itself into 
a work of art.3 But whereas nehamas had nietzsche’s doctrine of interpreta-
tion foremost in mind, the transformation of life into art has in fact occurred 
largely through the cultivation of “style” as corporate-sponsored and media-
driven “life-style” rather than as a manifestation of ethical individualism or 
of responsiveness to qualitative experience. And yet, to re-state my earlier 
point, the “reversal” of Platonism in contemporary aesthetic theory rests on 
what is at best an insufficiently nuanced view of what Plato has to say. it 
discounts Plato’s own propensity to write in a discourse that is highly imag-
istic; indeed, its attempted reversal of Plato applies more accurately to what 
became of Plato – to Platonism – rather than to Plato’s writings themselves. 
in the process, Plato’s understanding of the relationship between image and 
truth was obscured, and some of the force of aesthetics against the iconoclas-
tic opposition to images was lost.
taken in the root sense, “iconoclasm” suggests the destruction of im-
ages; more generally, it indicates the eradication or suppression of images. 
At the present historical moment such a desire seems anachronistic, if not 
inconceivable. We live in a cross-cultural, global world where images prevail 
above all else. images are the sites of some of the most heated contemporary 
conflicts, where some of the fiercest political and ideological debates are 
engaged. Witness the Abu Ghraib photographs, the Muhammad cartoons, 
the visual images of the 9/11 attacks, and the fascination with video images 
in the first Gulf War. the dominance of images is apparent in virtually all 
spheres of life – in politics, in commerce, as well as in academic circles, where 
there has been a noticeable turn away from the traditional practices of inter-
preting texts toward the reading of images. Along with Martin Jay’s critical 
account of the disparagement of vision in twentieth-century French thought 
(Downcast Eyes), there has been a plethora of books heralding the “visual 
turn” in criticism. Witness norman Bryson’s anthology Visual Culture, W. 
J. t. Mitchell’s Picture Theory, Gillian Rose’s Visual Methodologies, as well as 
books by Jonathan Crary (Techniques of the Observer), David Michael levin 
(Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision), and others.
2 “nur als aesthetisches Phänomen ist das Dasein und die Welt ewig gerechfertigt.” Die 
Geburt der Tragödie, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), 
p. 47. 
3 Alexander nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1985).
FiloVes_1_07_finale.indd   168 8.5.2007   9:30:27
169
the implication of images in the Revival of Aesthetics 
there is no doubt that we need to establish the role of aesthetics in the 
context of this culture of images, but in order to do so we also need to reflect 
critically on the received understanding of Plato’s critique and, in the proc-
ess, to place our thinking about images in relation to what we understand 
about the paradigm of production, which lies in different ways at the heart of 
Plato’s thought and of modern views. thus one part of my argument (which 
would take more space to demonstrate than is available) is that the contem-
porary culture of images evolved as the successor to the culture of industrial 
production, which it has nonetheless not left entirely behind. Guy Debord in 
The Society of the Spectacle, Baudrillard in Simulations, and Žižek in Welcome to 
the Dessert of the Real! already began to see that we need to expand and mod-
ify the Marxist understanding of industrial- and commodity-production in 
order to take into account the fact that simulations now provide grounding 
for the real. especially in Baudrillard and Debord it is clear that the primary 
object of production is no longer the manufactured commodity but the im-
age; the commodity simply provides a support that the image requires. But 
so too Jameson in his essay “Postmodernism, or the Cultural logic of late 
Capitalism” spoke of the consequences for politics of this “cultural form of 
image addiction”: a distorted understanding of the past and a stunted sense 
of any transformative hope for the future (“transforming the past into visual 
mirages, stereotypes, or texts, effectively abolishes any practical sense of the 
future and of the collective project”).4
But in spite of what these analyses have shown we still need better ways 
to deal with the de-centered and mostly globalized frameworks within which 
production has evolved in the new image-world. Marx already wrote of cir-
culation as “the movement in which general alienation appears as general 
appropriation, and general appropriation as general alienation.” He went 
on to explain that “because circulation is a totality of the social process, it is 
also the first form in which not only the social relation appears as something 
independent of the individuals as, say, in a coin or an exchange value, but 
the whole of the social movement itself.”5 (Cf. Debord: “the spectacle is not 
a collection of images; rather, it is a social relationship between people that 
is mediated by images.”)6 But as a result of more recent developments, “pro-
4 Fredric Jameson, “Postmodernism, or, the Cultural logic of late Capitalism,” in 
Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, nC: Duke University 
Press, 1991). 
5 karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Grundrisse: Foundations of 
the Critique of Political Economy, in Marx and engels, Collected Works, vol. 28 (new York: 
international Publishers, 1987), p. 180.
6 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald nicholson-smith (new York: 
zone Books, 1995), p. 12.
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duction” has become an aesthetic paradigm that incorporates the reproduc-
tion, dissemination, and transmission of images as well as their production. 
the term “aesthetics” here is not indexed philosophically in terms of beauty 
or art, but rather in terms of the world of appearances as determined by the 
pre-existing formation of commodity production (Debord: “the spectacle is 
capital accumulated to the point where it becomes image”).7
one could thus imagine a view in which the widespread interest in 
nietzsche’s revindication of appearances is in fact a symptom of the com-
modified image-world. the parallel question is whether a critical aesthetic 
theory can adopt Plato’s radical alternative. Certain aspects of Plato’s cri-
tique of images are so well known as to require only a brief summary here, 
but in other respects Plato’s views have been subjected to a long history of 
mis-interpretation. in a notorious passage in the Republic, X, Plato described 
the painted image of a bed as a degraded and inferior copy of an ideal form 
– a version of the truth twice removed. if the idea of bed is, as a form, eter-
nal, and so if made at all then made by a god, then what a carpenter makes 
is a copy of this form, and what a painter produces is a copy of a copy that 
would seem to have the weakest claim of all on the status of truth. Beyond 
this, Plato sustains a distinction between the making that is proper to arti-
facts and the process of emergence by which the things of nature come forth. 
stanley Rosen explained that 
the god does not stand to the idea of the bed and the constructed bed 
as he stands to the idea of the cow and the existing cow. By making 
the idea of the cow, the god also makes cows. But by making the idea 
of the bed, the god does not also make beds […]. there is as it were an 
ontological difference between the two kinds of work, natural and tech-
nical or demiurgic.8 
Moreover, it seems that the makers of such second- and third-order im-
ages – painters, poets, and the like – do not provide anything we might re-
ally want to know about the things they copy. Following Plato’s argument, 
we would consult a physician rather than a painter if we wanted to know the 
truth about the workings of the human body in order to cure the illnesses 
that afflict it, and we could consult an engineer if we wanted to construct a 
bridge that would withstand the forces of an earthquake. the implication is 
that the physician has some genuine knowledge of the body, and the engi-
7 Ibid., p. 24.
8 stanley Rosen, The Question of Being: A Reversal of Heidegger (new Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1993), p. 17.
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neer some genuine knowledge of bridges, whereas the painter merely knows 
something about the appearance (the “look”) of the body or the bridge. (the 
philosopher claims to know something higher and truer than painters, phy-
sicians, engineers, or anyone else.) Moreover, it seems to Plato that those 
who are expert in making images in words – the poets, and especially the 
tragic poets – are inclined to produce images that arouse passions and are 
untruthful in what they say about the gods. For these reasons, and for others 
articulated elsewhere in the dialogues, Plato is skeptical about the role of 
images in politics and in political education.
so much is widely accepted. But, as iris Murdoch pointed out in The 
Fire and the Sun, Plato never banished the poets from the state. He simply 
proposed leading them towards the edge. Plato distinguished between good 
poetry and bad, and suggested that a reformed kind of poetry might have an 
important role to play in political education. indeed, how could Plato reason-
ably exclude poetry on the grounds that it is a discourse of images (albeit 
of images made in words), since his own dialogues, the Republic included, 
depend heavily on images in order to lead souls, through a process of psych-
agogia, to an understanding of the truth? in fact, Plato’s understanding of 
what counts as “truth” is unimaginable apart from the imagistic discourse 
that carries it. think of the image of the divided line, or of the fire that casts 
shadows on the wall of the cave, or of the sound-image of the cicadas in the 
Phaedrus, or of the mental picture of the charioteer and his horses in the 
passage of the Republic where Plato describes the different parts of the soul. 
similar examples could be multiplied at great length. Choose almost any 
Platonic dialogue and, at its heart, there lies a constellation of images that is 
central to Plato’s understanding of the truth.9
 How then can we reconcile Plato’s reliance on images in his philosophi-
cal practice with his apparent censure of images in the philosophical theory 
of the Republic, and what can this tell us about the postmodern desire to 
“overturn” Plato? in order to pursue these questions it is useful to look at a 
crucial dialogue on this subject, the Sophist. Here, Plato is interested in estab-
lishing the difference between sophists and philosophers – a difference that 
turns in large measure on the images that each of them deploys. the Sophist 
9 the dramatic form of Plato’s dialogues has been commented upon by a distinguished 
line of philosophers and critics, among them Paul Friedlander, H. G. Gadamer, and 
leo strauss. More recently see Giovanni Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato’s 
Phaedrus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Andrea nightingale Wilson, 
Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), and Jill Gordon, Turning Toward Philosophy: Literary Device and Dramatic 
Structure in Plato’s Dialogues (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania state University Press, 
1999).
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relies centrally on the trope of hunting: the dialogue separates the technē of 
production and acquisition and then distinguishes among various forms of 
acquisition, including the acquisition of knowledge. Hunting is regarded as 
a particular means of acquiring. this is relevant to the central topic of the 
dialogue because Plato imagines that the search for the identity of the soph-
ist is a kind of hunt, and a particularly difficult one since the sophist seems 
so closely to resemble the philosopher. Plato’s success in establishing the 
identity of philosophy depends critically on the success of this hunt.
one might well expect that the difference between the sophist and the 
philosopher would turn on the fact that the one deals in images while the 
other does not. But this is not in fact the case. indeed, philosophy must be 
imagistic and the philosopher must use images, if only because knowledge 
is discursive and discourse is itself comprised of verbal images (εϊδωλα). the 
difference between philosophy and sophistry lies in the fact that the philoso-
pher is said to offer images that are true while the sophist offers images that 
are misleading and false.10 in Plato’s view, this is the difference between icons 
and phantasms: an icon is a true image whereas a phantasm is false. And while 
Plato clearly believes that one can recognize the difference between icons 
and phantasms, he does not offer an analytical method for distinguishing 
between them; he offers no set of procedures to serve as a sorting mecha-
nism independent of the intuition on which this distinction is based. in other 
words, a crucial difference between philosophy and sophistry depends upon 
a faculty that cannot be explained philosophically if we view the task of 
philosophy as an account of the truth that is both internally consistent and 
complete. on the contrary, the practice of philosophy requires an ability to 
distinguish between true and false images that has some form of intuition as 
its final ground. Understood in this sense, philosophy resembles what Blaise 
Pascal called the esprit de finesse more than the esprit géometrique, and is re-
lated to the classical theory of aesthetic taste that one finds in a philosopher 
such as kant. Better said, philosophy requires both an esprit de finesse and an 
esprit géometrique as well as the capacity to determine their appropriate roles 
and measure in any given situation. But this is a matter of wisdom, and for 
wisdom there is by definition no analytical procedure.
Before discussing some of the questions that this view raises for contem-
porary aesthetic theory, i would point out one important corollary of what 
has been said so far. What is regarded by Plato as true in the deepest sense 
10 see Plato’s Sophist, trans. seth Benardete (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1986), 235d–236c. see also stanley Rosen, Plato’s Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image 
(new Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
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is not a state of affairs or a set of propositions, but the whole. Philosophy is 
for Plato an articulation of the dream of the whole. the polis is one example 
of the whole, but is not itself the whole. Because even true statements must 
be other than and external to what they describe, discourse is by definition 
a part or a fragment, a view or perspective on the whole. the identification 
of truth itself with perspective in fact occurs much later, though well before 
nietzsche (e.g. in spinoza.) the Platonic dialogues are best viewed as key 
examples of such partial discourses insofar as they offer literary-dramatic 
perspectives from which Plato views the whole. Moreover, the fact that phi-
losophy proceeds by images and deals in icons is not just something that 
happens to be valid for Plato’s dialogues by way of accident or circumstance 
but is also, according to the implications of the dialogues, something that 
must necessarily be true of philosophy itself. Contrary to the received un-
derstanding of Plato’s views, this is because philosophy can claim no direct 
access to the true nature of things, but can only present the truth by means 
of images. Hence the various narratives (mythoi), dramas, and image-forms 
that Plato relies on in order to disclose the truth.
And yet various forms of philosophy since Plato have ignored this fun-
damental insight and instead have attempted to speak in a language that is 
true in some direct and non-imagistic fashion – in a language that strives to 
be coherent and complete in itself. Modern philosophy’s infatuation with 
formal logic and mathematics can be understood this way. A rather vivid ver-
sion of this philosophical dream is articulated in the writings of Descartes, 
whose explicit goal was to model philosophy along the lines of mathematics. 
insofar as Descartes hoped in so doing to purge philosophy of the distor-
tions he associated with certain kinds of images (fictions), he set a path for 
modern Western philosophy that, unlike Plato, is fundamentally iconoclas-
tic. the form of iconoclasm that is at issue here needs to be understood in 
the broad sense of the term described above – as involving the suppression of 
images. its mathematical pretensions are indicative insofar as mathematics 
is conceived as a discipline in which the truth appears directly to intuition. 
not surprisingly, this iconoclastic bias has had consequences for the ways 
in which modern philosophy tends to view literature. in modern Western 
thinking, Plato’s original distinction between phantasms and icons was re-
placed by the distinction between fiction and philosophy. it is, of course, this 
distinction that contemporary aesthetics in the nietzschean vein has been 
striving to overcome. But the realities are more complicated, both because of 
what philosophical discourse in the manner of Descartes reveals as a prac-
tice and because of what it wrongly assumes about Plato.
i have elsewhere commented that Descartes articulates an anti-aesthet-
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ic ideology that he scarcely adheres to in his own philosophical practice.11 
there is an even more pronounced divergence between philosophical prac-
tice and philosophical theory in Descartes than there is in Plato. (After all, 
Plato never attempted to present an account of how a “first philosophy” 
would function.) Although Descartes desires to model philosophy along the 
lines of mathematics and so to suppress images, his own discourse is richly 
imagistic. the Meditations and the Discourse on Method both rely so centrally 
on a series of images as to seem literary-poetic in nature. think of the im-
age of Descartes sitting in his dressing gown, by the fire in the stove-heated 
room; or of his description of the wax that softens and releases its aroma as 
he brings it near the warmth of the fire; or of falling into a whirlpool of water 
where he can neither reach the bottom nor swim to the top. But because the 
images of the Cartesian texts have so often been suppressed by interpret-
ers, the postmodern critique of Descartes is better understood as a critique 
of Cartesianism than of Descartes – and in roughly the same way that the 
postmodern critique of Western metaphysics is more a critique of Platonism 
than of Plato. these critiques are nonetheless relevant because they were 
embraced as part of the history of Western philosophy by a number of in-
fluential post-Cartesian (hence post-Platonic) thinkers. Hegel’s views of 
Descartes in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy were crucial in this proc-
ess, but i would also cite Wittgenstein’s definition of the world as “all that is 
the case” in the Tractatus and his concomitant relegation to silence of every-
thing that cannot be grasped in these terms. Hegel himself recognized the 
limitations of mathematical cognition and conceived of the Phenomenology 
of Spirit as meeting goals that mathematics could not fulfill.12 His aim was 
for the Phenomenology to be more encompassing, hence more true (and more 
“scientific”), than mathematics. And yet it is apparent that even in Hegel’s 
version the Absolute cannot encompass the whole. this is so if only because 
the Absolute cannot contain entry into itself; it must in fact begin. it is little 
surprise, then, that a thinker like Adorno attempted to stand the Hegelian 
dialectic on its head; central to the “negative dialectic” is Adorno’s associa-
tion of the whole with the untrue.13 And yet the principle of negative dialec-
11 see Anthony J. Cascardi, The Subject of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992).
12 Hegel describes the limitations of mathematical cognition in the Phenomenology, 
par. 42–46. For example: “philosophical cognition includes both [existence and essence], 
whereas mathematical cognition sets forth only the genesis of the existence, i.e. the being 
of the nature of the thing in cognition as such.” Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. v. Miller 
(oxford: oxford University Press, 1977), p. 24. 
13 see theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. e. B. Ashton (new York: Continuum, 
1979).
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tics carries the iconoclasm of modern philosophy forward while inverting 
the relationship between the whole and the true.
there is no doubt that Plato’s distinction between a world of appear-
ances and a world of ideas had an important bearing on Descartes’ thinking, 
just as it informed kant’s distinction between the phenomena and things-in-
themselves. And yet the hope to eliminate images from philosophy, and the 
relegation of such things as freedom and the will to the realm of silence, were 
never among Plato’s goals. (Plato’s aim was rather to preserve a distinction 
between image and original, and in this he differs profoundly from postmod-
ern, alias nietzschean, aesthetics.) the question of how Plato’s views about 
images became distorted is nonetheless a complex story; it begins already 
with Aristotle. Granted that Aristotle preserves something of Plato’s insights 
into the limitations of pure analysis and recognizes that wisdom must in-
clude different forms of cognition. For instance, Aristotle sustains the need 
to distinguish between the fitting and the true when he describes the various 
forms of knowledge and their appropriate degrees of certainty in connection 
with different modes of inquiry at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
And yet, as a metaphysician, Aristotle exhibits a clear and strong prefer-
ence for a discourse that is self-contained and analytical. As Rosen observes, 
it makes no difference whether the designation “metaphysics” derives from 
Aristotle himself or not, “metaphysics as we know it (but not necessarily as 
it ought to be known) is a product of Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition, 
not of Platonism.”14 it culminates in the philosophical treatise rather than in 
the dialogue, in narrative, or any other image-laden mode of discourse. the 
treatise suits metaphysics insofar as it provides “demonstrative knowledge, 
via predicative discourse, of pure forms.”15. Aristotle’s account of predica-
tion in the Categories establishes him as a precursor of modern philosophy’s 
“linguistic turn,” which adheres to metaphysics in spite of its emphasis on 
language.
Aristotle’s work eventually had a profound effect on the interpretation 
of Plato. indeed, with Plotinus it was assumed that Aristotle was one of the 
most effective expositors of Plato’s thought. As lloyd Gerson remarks, this 
was in part because Aristotle was assumed to know Plato’s philosophy, in-
cluding the “unwritten teachings,” first-hand and to have recorded it. in 
addition, early Greek historians of philosophy tell that Plotinus’ teacher, 
Ammonius saccas, was among those who assumed that Aristotle’s philoso-
phy was consistent with Platonism. this did not preclude disagreements be-
14 Rosen, Plato’s Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image, p. 30.
15 Ibid., p. 27.
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tween Aristotle and Plato nor did it prevent misunderstandings of Plato on 
Aristotle’s part. nevertheless, Plotinus’ adoption of many Aristotelian argu-
ments seems less puzzling when we realize that he took these as compatible 
with Platonism and as useful for articulating Plato’s position, especially in 
areas where Plato was not explicit.16
owing in part to the reception of Plotinus during the Renaissance, the 
interest in images in the “neo-platonic” tradition adopted a strangely mysti-
cal understanding of Plato’s distinction between appearances and ideas and 
assumed a hyperbolic interpretation of Plato’s arguments about beauty and 
the soul. (the text of Plotinus’ Enneads, rediscovered by Ficino, was crucial 
in this history.) if one adds to this neo-platonism an overlay of the scholastic 
reading of Aristotle and, beyond that, a dose of the Renaissance re-reading 
of Plato that concentrated on the Symposium rather than the Republic, it is 
not hard to understand how, by the time modern philosophy began, this 
accretion of commentary and mixing of sources had so seriously distorted 
Plato’s views that the entire tradition seemed in need of new foundations by 
a “scientifically” inclined philosopher such as Descartes. it was the mod-
ern, scientific version of fundamental ontology, grounded in epistemology, 
against which nietzsche was largely reacting when he spoke of reversing 
“Plato” in the name of overcoming metaphysics. in The Birth of Tragedy, for 
instance, socrates is targeted as a new type of “theoretical” man (“den Typus 
des theoretischen Menschen”).17
Moreover, nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics depends upon a response 
to Plato that is at best contradictory in its invocation of aesthetics. the alli-
ance between postmodern philosophy and aesthetics is equally paradoxical 
in ways that reflect the nietzschean roots of contemporary thought. Both are 
committed to “aesthetic” principles even while they deny the existence of a 
self-contained aesthetic sphere. in the case of aesthetic theory, there is gen-
eral acceptance of Arthur Danto’s view that, while not everything is a work 
of art, anything can be a work of art. (it is worth remembering that among 
Danto’s early works is a book on nietzsche.)18 For nietzsche, the issue was 
more “existential.” As noted above, his conclusion in The Birth of Tragedy was 
that life itself could be justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon. the point 
is that the turn towards aesthetics depends upon a de-definition of the aes-
thetic sphere, which is to say, upon a gesture that releases aesthetics from the 
confines of art even while it absorbs life into an aesthetic sphere.
16 lloyd Gerson, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. “Plotinus,” (http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/plotinus/).
17 nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie, p. 98; my emphasis.
18 Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (new York: MacMillan, 1965).
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these apparent contradictions are somewhat more intelligible if we 
place the postmodern (nietzschean) engagement with Plato in the context 
of the social and material worlds in which it has taken root, i.e. in light of the 
cultural pre-eminence of the image. images in contemporary culture are not 
just everywhere – on every surface and in every medium, saturating every 
space – but occupy a place that is in advance of the thing itself. the proc-
esses of globalization seem to count on what we might call, after Baudrillard, 
the “precession” of the image, meaning that the image precedes the real not 
just temporally but ontologically.19 the physical space of times square has 
been transformed into a collage of digital surface-images; nearly every build-
ing there has become de-materialized, its interior functions subordinated to 
the display of capital on its video-façade (advertising images, multinational 
power, and seduction). the most “ordinary” cellular phones function as 
cameras; they show video clips, transmit text, and allow access to the image-
rich content of the internet. “Personal” music devices (i-Pods etc.) now cap-
ture televised images for consumption “on the go.” one of the grandest and 
most beautiful natural wonders in China, the Jouzhaigou valley, announces 
itself to the visitor on large-scale exterior screens that project, among other 
things, images of the park itself. these simulacra have the effect not only of 
announcing (or advertising) the real, but of legitimizing it. Wrapped around 
Motorola’s China headquarters is a 13-story poster, and Pepsi qualified for 
a Guinness record for the largest tri-vision outdoor billboard in Chongqing 
with a Gatorade advertisement that measured 108 x 295 feet. there is talk of 
installing the largest video screen ever in the Gargantuan (7.3 million square 
feet) Golden Resources shopping mall outside Beijing – a screen some 30 x 
250 meters in size that will form an artificial sky over this enormous mall. 
For good or for ill, the visual turn in criticism, and the aesthetic turn in 
theory, coincide with the rise of this brave new image-world.
Already in 1983 Baudrillard wrote of the “induction,” “infiltration,” 
and “illegible violence” of the media.20 the question now facing aesthetics 
is whether it can respond critically and not merely with fascination or cyni-
cism to a culture that increasingly understands itself as producing, and as 
produced by, images. i would recall Jameson’s critique of “the complacent 
(yet delirious) camp-following celebration” of this aesthetic new world” even 
while recognizing the power of current fantasies about the “salvational na-
ture of high technology, from chips to robots.”21 the question for a critical 
19 Baudrillard, “the Precession of simulacra,” in Simulations.
20 Baudrillard, Simulations, p. 55.
21 Jameson, Postmodernism, p. 46.
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aesthetic theory is whether we can identify some “’moment of truth’ within 
the more evident ‘moments of falsehood’” of this culture.”22
if there is to be any hope of doing so we need first to re-establish the 
links between the postmodern culture of images and the paradigm of pro-
duction. i would argue that Western modernity and its successor, postmod-
ernism, is at once a historical frame and a cultural field in which the para-
digm of production prevails. this holds true both intellectually and in social 
and material terms. the productionist idea has a long history, going back to 
Plato, whose discussion of poiēsis was part of a critique of productionism 
that pits him against modern thinkers. indeed, Plato and kant share less 
in this regard than kant and Marx. For it was with kant that philosophy 
came to recognize that we truly can know only that which we make. For 
Marx, human beings produce not unilaterally but universally; production is 
self-production. More strongly stated, the fundamental form of human pro-
duction in Western modernity is history.23 Within the framework of history 
as it is understood in modernity, one can interpret actions as fitting or just, 
and one can assess their sense by reference to narrative forms and frames (as 
in Hayden White’s account in Metahistory). these principles of judgment, 
taste, and form rely on the premise that there is no place outside of histo-
ry from which to evaluate it. kant recognized this much in his essay “An 
old Question Raised Again: is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?” 
indeed, since the modern understanding of production accepts the view 
that history constitutes the whole, there is no possibility that there could 
exist any “other” domain to which its discourse might appeal. History is the 
whole, and it is produced.
to situate images within the historical sphere is, first of all, to recognize 
that they too are produced. this much seems uncontroversial. Yet i would 
argue that the contemporary culture of images also marks a fundamental 
transformation within the paradigm of production. We live at a moment 
when images are not merely the products of human activity (history) but 
also play an integral role in producing it. the result is a new, more fluid 
sense of the grounding of the “real” in the image. in part for this reason criti-
cal practice can no longer be oriented around a historicism that is wedded 
to familiar forms of materialism, in part because the object of critique for 
classical materialism referred to a “real” that was grounded in the categories 
of time, space, and matter. its goal was to bring the productionist paradigm, 
22 Ibid., p. 47.
23 see karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in Early Writings, trans. 
Rodney livingstone and Gregor Benton (new York: vintage, 1975), p. 391.
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in its full historical-materialist dimension, to light. By contrast, the contem-
porary culture of images takes as its point of departure a shift in both the 
ordinary and the philosophical suppositions of an equivalence between the 
“real” and the temporal, spatial, and material world. in spite of the fact that 
the image cannot in the end escape the coordinates of time, space, and mat-
ter, it offers a de-materialized, pseudo-transcendent version of the material 
world. Classical Marxism allowed us to grasp the conditions by which an au-
tomobile is produced (labor, time, materials, capital, etc.), whereas a recent 
Mercedes advertisement proposes “You’re not buying a car. You’re buying 
a belief.” We require a critique of image-production, and not merely of pro-
duction in the old sense, in order to deal with such circumstances. And yet, 
this brave new image-world is one in which the effects of earlier, materialist 
modes of production have left indelible traces, which is also to say that it 
is a world in which the alienated forms of labor and disenchanted forms of 
social interaction derived from the era of industrial capitalism have assumed 
a surprising degree of permanence and an appearance of normativity. When 
Jameson writes that the postmodern world is affectless, and that anxiety and 
alienation are no longer relevant,24 he means to describe the displacement of 
modernism’s alienation by a new sense of fragmentation. But the fragmenta-
tion of the subject is something for which, i would argue, the alienation of 
commodity production is a precondition.
the question is whether the “revival” of aesthetics can offer grounds for 
a critical understanding of such matters. or is aesthetics merely content to 
cordon off a sphere for “art” so as to avoid these questions? the sources of 
a critical posture that might measure up to these challenges are admittedly 
difficult to find. the orthodox reading of Plato does offer one basis for a 
critical response to the new image-world, but is hardly without drawbacks. 
While Plato accepts the view that we have no direct access to originals, but 
only to images, he also hopes to judge images true or false depending on 
whether they resemble (are justly proportional to) the originals which they 
represent. For Plato, the relationship between image and truth is analogous 
to the relationship between icon and original. And, as i suggested above, 
the Platonic understanding of originals carries with it a view that is at odds 
with the ways in which the contemporary world has come to experience it-
self as an effect of production. Moreover, Plato’s view seems unable to shed 
its intellectual elitism; it seems reliant on the anti-democratic belief that the 
ability to grasp the truth is not shared equally among all individuals but is 
the province of a privileged (philosophical) few. it is no surprise that Plato’s 
24 Jameson, p. 14.
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ideal state is ruled by a king – a philosopher-king, to be sure, but a king just 
the same.
Where then to turn? to recap, my own view is that the contemporary 
culture of images represents a heightened, extreme, transformed version of 
the paradigm of production, and ought to be considered within this frame-
work. As sketched out above, this means not just that the image world is 
produced but that what is produced is primarily an image-world, not social or 
material reality. Whereas in Plato the image could be redeemed insofar as it 
was a truthful semblance of the eternal forms, we live in a culture where the 
image-domain claims to constitute the truth, which it also puts in brackets, 
as “truth.” the image suggests itself as all-encompassing in a way that dis-
places or subordinates the claims of the social, the material, and the natural, 
not to mention the true. in Jameson’s analysis, this resulted first in a new 
aesthetic emphasis on what he called the machines of reproduction: 
not the turbine, nor even sheeler’s grain elevators or smokestacks, not 
the baroque elaboration of pipes and conveyor belts, nor even the strea-
mlined profile of the railroad train […] but rather the computer, whose 
outer shell has no emblematic or visual power […]. such machines are 
indeed machines of reproduction rather than of production.25 
twenty-five years later we can see that the computer has come to serve 
as a new (i.e. post-filmic) kind of “apparatus” for image-support.26 Hence the 
confluence of computer monitor and flat-screen t.v., not to mention all other 
manner of computer-powered image-devices (mp3 players, web-enabled mo-
bile phones, portable/personal dvd payers).
to understand the image-domain as a transformation of the paradigm 
of production in turn allows us to locate some points of engagement for a 
critical response to it. Plato thought that images could be truthful resem-
blances of inaccessible originals, but now the question for aesthetics is as 
much to discover what the image-world renders invisible. What, in spite of 
the pervasive appeal to the visual, is necessarily excluded from its view? i 
would identify the following points as necessary considerations for any fur-
ther development of an aesthetic critique of the image-world, and likewise 
as central to the viability of aesthetics as a critical enterprise in an age where 
aesthetic theory can no longer essentially be linked exclusively to art:
25 Ibid., p. 36–7.
26 see the essays in Philip Rosen (ed.), Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory 
Reader (new York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
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1. that the seepage of images every area of contemporary life – the satu-
ration of life by image – means that there is no longer a separate aesthetic 
sphere for aesthetic theory to address. Aesthetics is at once everywhere and 
nowhere.
2. that with the advent of the image-world the material basis of mak-
ing has given way to increasingly diffuse forms of production. Accordingly, 
historical materialism needs to be supplemented by a critical response to the 
de-materialized forms of production that prevail today.
3. that the media by which images are transmitted are increasingly 
hybrid in their nature because they are increasingly de-coupled from their 
materials. the de-differentiation of the aesthetic sphere in turn means that 
the medium-bound specificity of the arts is indeed a thing of the past. the 
question raised by Jean-luc nancy – “Why Are there several Arts and not 
Just one?”27 – needs to be re-phrased around the new hybridization of the 
media.
4. that production is increasingly de-centered and globalized, and that 
the forms of agency associated with it are structural and diffuse rather than 
punctual. Rather than continue to think of the effects of image-making in 
terms of mass culture and collective agency, aesthetics must take structural 
agency into account and come to grips with the forms of power that sustain 
it.
5. that the moments of transmission, communication, and dissemina-
tion all form part of the paradigm of production, and are not mere append-
ages to it.
6. that images have come to challenge some basic assumptions about 
the categories of time and space. increasingly, the force of images depends 
no so much upon their impact in a given place or at a given time, but upon 
the velocity of their circulation from place to place. theoretically, this means 
recognizing the ways in which the rate of circulation and velocity of images 
provides an aesthetic grounding of the real.
7. if aesthetics seems now to require a critique of images, as distinct from 
the criticism of texts or works, the relationship between ethics and aesthetics 
needs likewise to be re-thought by asking about what images say above and 
beyond what they show, and likewise what they require. As a paradigm of 
response, the ideal of universal judgment drawn from kant needs to be re-
vised. the task is not so much to locate the grounds for universal judgment 
27 Jean-luc nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy kamuf (stanford: stanford University 
Press, 1996), pp. 1–39.
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but to find the means to question the images that present themselves as if 
with the force of universal assent.
8. in conclusion i would propose that earlier views of globalization, as 
well as the strategy of “cognitive mapping” that Jameson developed, in part 
at least as a response to it, were overly confident about the enduring quali-
ties of space. to be sure, there was never any sense that a new aesthetic (of 
practice or of theory) would invite a return to some older geographical or na-
tion-based notion of space, but would have to respond to the world-space of 
multinational capital and its flows. Jameson believed that this space would 
bring a breakthrough to “some as yet unimaginable new mode of represent-
ing […] in which we may again begin to grasp our positioning as individual 
and collective subjects and regain a capacity to act and struggle.”28 the po-
litical form of postmodernism, he went on to say, would have as its vocation 
“the invention and projection of a global cognitive mapping, on a social as 
well as a spatial scale.”29 nearly a quarter of a century later we can see that 
these “new modes of representing” have indeed arrived, and that their form 
is the electronic production, dissemination, and communication of images. 
We can furthermore claim that these new modes of representing have trans-
formed some of the foundations of the production of the “real.” now, more 
than ever before, art finds itself faced with the challenge of representing 
time in the absence of space, and vice-versa, of acting in space where the 
nearly simultaneity of reception all but obliterates time. the task that is yet 
to be accomplished for aesthetic theory is to incorporate such concepts as the 
“circulation” and “flow” of images and to engage critically with these in the 
face of a world that has been fundamentally transformed by this latest turn 
in the production paradigm.
28 Jameson, p. 54.
29 Ibid.
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